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THE HEARSAY RULE AND JIS EXCEPT[ONS
RICHARD C. DONNELLY*
THE NATURE OF HEARSAY
Article VIII of the Uniform Rules of Evidence deals with hear-
say.' Rule 63 states a general policy of exclusion which is then
qualified by thirty-one subsections containing exceptions. This rule
follows Wigmore - in defining hearsay as a "statement which is
made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing offered
to prove the truth of the matter stated."
Relevant oral and written expressions made out of court may be
offered for an infinite variety of purposes other than to prove the
facts asserted. 3 When this is so, the hearsay rule is not a bar.' Thus,
Hanson v. Johnson5 involved an action to recover damages for con-
version of corn which the plaintiff as landlord claimed as his share
of the crop. He offered evidence that the tenant pointed out to him
the corn in question and said, ". . . [H]ere is you share for this
year's corn; this belongs to you, Mr. Hanson." The court said :G
"There is no question but that plaintiff owned some corn. It was
necessary to identify it. The division made his share definite.
This division and identity was made by the acts of tenant in
husking the corn and putting it in separate cribs and then his
telling Hanson which was his share and the latter's acquiescence
therein. The language of the tenant was the very fact necessary
to be proved .... The words were the verbal acts .... There
could be no division without words or gestures identifying the
respective shares. This was a fact to be shown in the chain of
proof of title."
Other cases illustrate the same principleJ
*Professor of Law, Yale Law School. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the assistance rendered by Mr. Edwin M. Schur, LL.B., 1955, Yale
Law School.
1. Among the significant discussions of Article VIII are the following:
Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 43
(1954)'; McCormick, Some High Lights of the Uniform Evidence Rules, 33
Tex. L. Rev. 599 (1955) ; Comment, A Sympostum on the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, 49 Nw. U. L. Rev. 481 (1954).
Professor McCormick's excellent text discusses the Uniform Rules at
pertinent places. McCormick, Evidence 455-634 (1954).
2. 5 Vigmore, Evidence § 1361 (3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited as Vig-
more).
3. Many courts, including the Minnesota Supreme Court, deal with these
situations by invoking the ubiquitous phrase res geslae. This solution is not
only unnecessary but does affirmative harm by paralyzing analysis. See the
excellent Note, 22 Minn. L. Rev. 391, 393 (1938). But see Slough, Res Gestae,
2 Kan. L. Rev. 44, 121, 246 (1954).
4. 6 Wigmore § 1766.
5. 161 Minn. 229, 201 N. W 322 (1924).
6. Id. at 230, 201 N. W at 322.
7. E.g., Patterson-Stocking, Inc. v. Dunn Bros., 201 Minn. 308, 276
N. XV 737 (1937) (evidence of instruction given driver introduced to show
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Utterances or writings may also be offered to show an effect on
the hearer or reader. The purpose is to prove circumstantially the
state of mind of the person to whom the statement is made, such as
notice, knowledge,8 motive, or to show the information he had as
bearing on the reasonableness or good faith of his subsequent con-
duct. For example, in Trainor v. Buchanan Coal Co.,0 a credit report
about the buyer was held admissible to show the seller's good faith
in refusing to ship goods. Also, under a plea of self-defense, com-
municated threats are admissible to show reasonable apprehension
of danger on the part of the defendant.' 0
In addition, declarations may be offered to show circumstantially
the feelings or state of mind of the declarant without offending the
hearsay rule. For example, in Peterson v. Pete-Erwkson Co.," an
action was brought by a husband to recover damages for the wrong-
ful death of his wife. A friend of the deceased wife was called as a
witness and testified, over objection, to a conversation wherein the
wife referred complainingly to her husband's drinking and indicated
she was considering a divorce. It was held that these declarations
of the deceased wife tended to show the character of the relation
between husband and wife and were not objectionable as hearsay
but admissible as part of the res gestae.
Is the hearsay rule limited to what someone has previously said
or written or does it apply as well to conduct (including silence)
when offered to show belief to prove the fact believed? Rule 62(1)
defines "statement" as including "not only an oral or written expres-
sion but also non-verbal conduct of a person intended as a substitute
for words in expressing the matter stated." Where the conduct is
obviously intended by the actor to be "a substitute for words," as
where he has pointed for identification 2 or has used signals or sign
language, the behavior should be treated precisely as verbal asser-
tions and the Rule seems to so provide. On the other hand, the
language of the Rule would abrogate the orthodox doctrine which
excludes evidence of non-verbal and non-assertive conduct if its
whether latter was in scope of employment, admissible as "part of tile very
fact in issue") , State v. Sweeney, 180 Minn. 450, 231 N. W 225 (1930)
(Bribery prosecution, evidence of conversations between co-conspirator and
third persons admissible as verbal acts and utterances "within the issue"),
Elwood v. Saterlie, 68 Minn. 173, 71 N. W 13 (1897) (statements by one in
possession as to who the owner is, admissible in cases involving title as "part
of the res gestae").
8. Keller v. Wolf, 239 Minn. 397, 58 N. W 891 (1953), Mardorf v.
Duluth-Superior Transit Co., 196 Minn. 347, 265 N. W 32 (1936).
9. 154 Minn. 204, 191 N. W 431 (1923).
10. State v. Dee, 14 Minn. (Gil. 27) 35 (1869), State v. Dumphey, 4
Minn. (Gil. 340) 438 (1860).
11. 186 Minn. 583, 244 N. W 68 (1932).
12. See State v. Findling, 123 Minn. 413, 144 N. W 142 (1913)
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relevancy depends upon inferences flowing from the conduct to the
belief of the actor, and finally to the truth of the fact believed. This
conduct, under conventional theory, amounts to an "implied asser-
tion" of the fact it is offered to prove and must be excluded wherever
an express assertion would be excluded as.hearsay.1 For example,
it is sometimes held that a defendant charged with crime may not
show in exoneration that another took refuge in flight after the
crime was committed. Evidence that this third person had made
an express confession would be excluded by most courts. 1 There-
fore, on the same ground, some courts have called the flight-evidence
"hearsay" and have excluded it.15
In addition to instances of affirmative conduct, there are more
numerous situations where silence or passive behavior is offered to
show belief m order to prove the fact believed. In Sullivan v. Min-
izeapolis Street Ry.,1 6 the plaintiff brought suit to recover damages
sustained when a street car in which she was a standing passenger
came to an emergency stop to avoid collision. She claimed the car
was crowded and many passengers who were standing were hurled
forward and fell. Defendant, Trough a claim agent, was permitted
to show that no other claim for damages arising out of the same
accident was filed. It should be noted that the claim agent was, in
effect, testifying that various persons had told him they had sus-
tained no injuries. After stressing the breadth of the trial judge's
discretion, the court said :1
13. Wright v. Tatham, 7 Ad. & Ell. 313 (Ex. CIL 1837), aff'd, 5 Cl &
Fin. 670, 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L. 1838).
14. Donnelly v. U. S., 228 U. S. 243 (1913). See Note, 21 Minn. L Rev.
181 (1937).
15. State v. Minella, 177 Iowa 283, 158 N. W. 645 (1916) ; McCornck,
Evidence 473 (1954). I have found no Minnesota cases on this point. How-
ever, the court does admit evidence of the flight of the accused, not on the
theory that his conduct is hearsay but within the admissions exception, but on
tie ground that it is circumstantial evidence showing "consciousness of
guilt" State v. McTague, 190 Minn. 449, 252 N. W 446 (1934).
Other examples of implied hearsay gleaned from Wright v. Tatham are
as follows: (1) Proof that the underwriters have paid the amount of the
policy, as evidence of the loss of a ship; (2) Proof of payment of a wager,
as evidence of the happening of the event wluch was the subject of the bet;
(3) Precautions of the family, to show the person involved was a lunatic; (4)
The conduct of a deceased captain on a question of seaworthiness, who, after
examining every part of the vessel embarked in it with his family.
In general, see McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 Yale L. J.
489 (1930); Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1138
(1935), The Hearsay Rule, 12 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1937), Some Suggestions for
Defining and Classifying Hearsay, 86 U. Pa. L. Rev. 258 (193t), Hearsay
Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177
(1948).
16. 161 Minn. 45, 200 N. W 922 (1924).
17. Id. at 50, 200 N. IV. 924 at 924. See also Albertson v. Chicago R. R.,
64 N. W. 2d 175 (Minn. 1954) ; Nubbe v. Hardy Cont. Hotel, 225 Minn. 496,
31 N. W. 2d 332 (1948).
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"In view of the claims of plaintiff, this testimony had some bear-
ing upon the improbability of the accident happening as she
claimed. That bearing may have been remote and of little weight,
but with that we are not concerned. This testimony related to a
collateral fact, and in the discretion of the trial court was ad-
missible. It had a direct tendency to show that the statements of
a witness on one side were more reasonable, and therefore more
credible, than the statements of a witness on the other side. Such
testimony is admissible, but obviously must be received with
caution."
The cases involving silence rarely recognize the hearsay problem.
Where they do, the majority exclude.18
The Uniform Rules would apparently treat conduct, including
silence, not reasonably intended to be communicative as circumstan-
tial evidence rather than hearsay Admissibility would thus depend
upon the standard of relevancy by which all circumstantial evidence
is tested. This would be in accord with the general approach of the
Minnesota Supreme Court.
EXCEPTIONS
Prevzous Statements of Witnesses
Rule 63(1) would make a substantial change in Minnesota law
It would admit as an exception to the hearsay rule
"A statement previously made by a person who is present at the
hearing and available for cross-examination with respect to the
statement and its subject matter, provided the statement would
be admissible if made by declarant while testifying as a witness."
The argument in favor of such a rule has been forcefully stated
by Wigmore as follows .19
" [Tihe witness is present and subject to cross-examina-
tion. There is ample opportunity to test him as to the basis of his
former statement. The whole purpose of the Hearsay rule has
been already satisfied. Hence there is nothing to prevent the tri-
bunal from giving such testimonial credit to the extrajudicial
statement as it may seem to deserve. Psychologically of course,
the one statement is as useful to consider as the other, and every-
day experience outside of courtrooms is in accord."
18. Menard v. Cashman, 94 N. H. 428, 55 A. 2d 156 (1947) , McCor-
mick, Evidence 478 (1954), Falkner, Silence as Hearsay, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev.
192 (1940).
19. 3 Wigmore § 1018. Other distinguished authorities have expressed
similar views. Maguire, Evidence. Common Sense and Common Law 59-63(1947). McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Sub-
stantive Evidence, 25 Tex. L. Rev. 573, 576 (1947) . Morgan, Hearsay
Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177,
192 (1948).
The English Evidence Act of 1938 makes admissible, as proof of the fact
stated, any prior written statement of a witness with personal knowledge.
1 & 2 Geo. VI, c. 28, sec. 1.
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Nevertheless, the prevailing view still holds prior inconsistent
or consistent statements of a witness not usable as substantive evi-
dence of the facts stated; they may be received only for impeachment
or rehabilitation. Indeed, the leading decision supporting the ortho-
dox position is the Minnesota case of State v. Saport.20 Professor
McCormick has undertaken to summarize and answer the argu-
ments made in that decision, as follows .-21
"First, the oath and liability to punishment for perjury are
wanting.
This must be granted, and the question is whether the want
is fatal in view of (1) the fact that the prior statement was
nearer to the event, and hence freshcr in memory, than the pres-
ent testimony and (2) the opportunity to cross-examine.
Second, the 'principle virtue' of cross-examination 'is in its
immediate application of the testing process.' There was no
immediate opportunity of cross-examination of the previous
statement.
But another virtue of cross-examination is in its opportunity
to require the witness to explain the discrepancies of conflicting
statements, and when this process is afforded, it seems that the
earlier statement should at least stand equal with the later.
Third, the unrestricted use as evidence of impeaching state-
ments would 'increase both temptation and opportunity for the
manufacture of evidence.'
But it must be remembered that this temptation exists almost
equally under the orthodox rule, since the statements will come
in to impeach and will be considered by the jury as evidence,
regardless of contrary instructions, if there is an issue of fact
to submit.I Fourth, if the hearsay rule is satisfied as to prior contradic-
tory statements, it is equally so as to statements consistent with
his testimony, and would lead to their admission as substantive
evidence, and this, presumably, he would argue, would still
further open the door to the evil last mentioned, that of manu-
facturing evidence, by securing successive statements from the
witnesses.
To this it may be answered that the extension suggested
seems a logical one, and it is accepted in the provisions of the
English Evidence Act of 1938 and the Uniform Rule. Such an
extension may encourage further the early taking of written
statements from the witnesses, and the securing so far as possible
of additional statements on fact-questions later revealed in the
progress of investigation. These practices, however, are pre-
cisely those followed by diligent parties and counsel under the
present system."
20. 205 Minn. 258, 285 N. W 8P8 (1939). See also State v. McClain,
208 finn. 91, 292 N. W 753 (1940).
21. McCormick, Evidence 81 (1954).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW V.
Rule 63(1) would permit substantive use of both prior con-
sistent 22 and inconsistent statements. The former present fewer
difficulties than the latter.2 3 First of all, the declarant has personal
knowledge of the event described and remembers it since the prior
statement is, by hypothesis, consistent with his trial testimony
Cross-examination at the trial is fully as adequate as it would have
been at the time the prior statement was made. Furthermore,
under Rule 45, the trial judge is given discretion to exclude evidence if
he finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk
that its admission will "(a) necessitate undue consumption of time,
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing
the issues or of misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully
surprise a party who has not had reasonable opportunity to antici-
pate that such evidence would be offered." Unless there has been
substantial impeachment of the witness his prior consistent state-
ments would add very little to his trial testimony and it is likely
that they would be excluded by the trial judge under Rule 45.
Both Professors McCormick 24 and Falknor 25 have reservations
with respect to prior inconsistent statements. If the witness re-
members ihe event to which the statement relates and admits making
it then cross-examination at the trial would seem adequate. But
suppose that he denies making it and insists that he does not
remember the event to which it refers and denies that he observed the
event. Both McCormick and Falknor would require a showing that
the declarant had an opportunity to observe the facts stated2" and
also strong assurance that the prior statement was actually maIde. 27
This could be established by a writing 28 or the admission of the
declarant as a witness.
These suggested modifications of Rule 63(1) may make it
22. Apparently, in Minnesota, prior consistent statements can be used
to rehabilitate a witness only %vhen he has been impeached by prior incon-
sistent statements coupled with a claim that the present testimony of the
witness is a "recent contrivance." This is more restrictive than the usual
rule. See Note, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 724, 729 (1952).
22a. For a view with "reservatioiis" on this change see companion article
by DeParcq at p. 338 et seq.
23. Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U. C. L. A.
L. Rev. 43, 52 (1954).
24. McCormick, Evidence 82 (1954).
25. Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U. C. L. A.
L. Rev. 43, 53 (1954)
26. Falknor would require a judicial finding of personal knowledge. See
Falknor, supra note 25 at 54.
27 Falknor, supra note 25, at 82.
28. This is the requirement of the English Evidence Act of 1938. See
note 19, supra.
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more palatable in states where its effect would be a drastic modifi-
cation of existing practice. But, if the witness claims to have no
recollection or knowledge of the event, the need for the evidence
is just as great as if he were "unavailable" because of death, illness,
absence, or exempt from testifying on the ground of privilege.20
"Moreover both the adversary and the jury are m a more advan-
tageous position to evaluate the evidence than they would be if the
declarant were not subject to present cross-examination. They
need not rely solely upon the witness who reports the declaration;
they have him and the declarant before them, and can make up
their minds whether to believe either or neither of them. 3 0
Under existing doctrine which limits the use of prior statements
to the question of credibility it is doubtful whether a cautionary in-
struction is any more than a mere ritual and futile gesture. Prac-
tically, the jurors decide which story is true and give it substantive
weight. If these assumptions as to jury behavior are correct, then
the most important change by Rule 63(1) would be one of the
sufficiency rather than the admissibility of the evidence. Under the
present view, no case is made out when the only evidence on a
material matter is the witness's prior statement.3' Upon proper
motion the case is taken from the jury or its verdict set aside. Rule
63(1) authorizes a contrary result.
Depositions and Prior Testimony
Clause (a) of Rule 63(3) does not require that a deponent be
unavailable as a witness in order for the deposition to be used
at the trial of the action in which the deposition was taken. This
would conflict with Rule 26.04 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure which make unavailability a prerequisite unless "such
exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the
interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of present-
ing the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the
deposition to be usec" 32 In criminal cases, there would be a serious
-question as to whether clause (a), as well as the 'remainder of
Rule 63(3), would not violate Article 1, Section 6 of the Minne-
29. For a discussion of loss of memory as a.ground of unavailability see
McCormick, Evidence 494 (1954). Rule 62(7) of the Uniform Rules does not
list this as a ground. In Stein v. Swenson, 46 Mmin. 360, 49 N. V. 55 (1891)
it was held that the failure of a witness to recollect the particular facts, "short
of imbecility," will not justify proving his testimony on a former trial.
30. Model Code of Evidence 234 (1942).
31. McCormick, Evidence 77 (1954). Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and
Its Exceptions, 2 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 43, 54 (1954).
32. Minn. R. Civ. P. Rule 26.04. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 26(d).
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sota Constitution ensuring the right of confrontation in criminal
prosecution.
33
Clause (b) would admit former testimony given as a witness in
another action or in a deposition taken in compliance with law for
use as testimony in the trial of another action if the judge finds that
the declarant is unavailable as a witness 3
4
"when (i) the testimony is offered against a party who offered
it in his own behalf on the former occasion, or against the succes-
sor in interest of such party, or (ii) the issue is such that the
adverse party on the former occasion had the right and oppor-
tunity for cross examination with an interest and motive similar
to that which the adverse party has in the action in which the
testimony is offered."
The two traditional reasons for excluding hearsay-that declar-
ant was not under oath and that the adversary had no opportunity
to cross-examine him, are absent where the statements sought to be
introduced were given by a witness as testimony in a former trial
of the same issues between the same parties. If the witness has died
prior to the second trial all courts will admit his testimony, and
most will do so even though his unavailability results from other
causes. When, however, either issues or parties are dissimilar,
there is no agreement as to whether former testimony is admissible.
The strict common law rule demanded substantial identity of both,
a requirement occasionally phrased in terms of mutuality or re-
ciprocity " This requirement was severely criticized by Wigmoreo
33. The Uniform Rules do not consider the problem of confrontation.
In the comment to Rule 63(3) it is stated. "As in several other areas, the
constitutional question may or may not be a barrier to the use of the testi-
mony. We are dealing in this rule with the question of hearsay and with that
subject only." The problem is discussed in McCormick, Evidence 482 (1954).
34. Rule 62(7) is as follows "'Unavailable as a witness' includes situa-
tions where the witness is (a) exempted on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the matter to which his statement is relevant, or (b)
disqualified from testifying to the matter, or (c) unable to be present or to
testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental
illness, or (d) absent beyond the jurisdiction of the court to compel appear-
ance by its process, or (e) absent from the place of hearing because the
proponent of his statement does not know and with diligence has been unable
to ascertain his whereabouts.
But a witness is not unavailable (a) if the judge finds that his exemption,
disqualification, inability or absence is due to procurement or wrongdoing of
the proponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from
attending or testifying, or to the culpable neglect of such party, or (b) if
unavailability is claimed under clause (d) of the preceding paragraph and
the judge finds that the deposition of the declarant could have been taken by
the exercise of reasonable diligence and without undue hardship, and that the
probable importance of the testimony is such as to justify the expense of
taking such desposition."
35. Annot., 142 A. L. R. 673 (1943).
36. 5 Wigmore § 1388.
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and has been rejected in some jurisdictions, including Minnesota."
The Uniform Rules not only abolish the mutuality requirement
but would admit former testimony if "the issue is such that the
adverse party on the former occasion had the right and opportunity
for cross-examination with an interest and motive similar to that
which the adverse party has in the action in which the testimony is
offered." This "natural next step" 35 has been taken by Minnesota
and a few other courts.3 9 In Cox v. Selover,40 testimony taken in a
former trial-against a guarantor of a note was held admissible in a
later trial against the principal maker of the note, who had inter-
vened after the first trial. The court said:
"While it is obvious that appellants are not the same parties,
their interests are substantially the same, especially as to the
outcome of the litigation.... There was a substantial identity of
parties and.., the issues were the same, and to have excluded
the proffered testimony would have been error."'41
Contemporaneous Statements and Statements Admissible on
Ground of Necessity Generally
Rule 63 (4) proposes three hearsay exceptions.
"A statement (a) which the judge finds was made while the
declarant was perceiving the event or condition which the state-
ment narrates, describes or explains, or (b) which the judge
finds was made while the declarant was under the stress of a
nervous excitement caused by such perception, or (c) if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness, a statement narrating, de-
scribing or explaining an event or condition which the judge
finds was made by the declarant at a time when the matter had
been recently perceived by him and while his recollection Nwas
dear, and was made in good faith prior to the commencement of
the action."
37. Palon v. Great Northern Ry., 135 Minn. 154, 160 N. XV. 670 (1916),
1 Minn. L. Rev. 183 (1917). See also Lougee v. Bray, 42 Min. 323, 44 N. NV.
194 (1890).
38. McCormick, Evidence 489 (1954). Professor McCormick feels that
neither identity of parties nor privity between parties is essential. "These are
merely means to an end. Consequently, if it appears that in the former suit
a party having a like motive to cross-examine about the same matters as the
present party would have, was accorded an adequate opportunity for such
examination, the testimony may be received against the present party. Identity
of interest, m the sense of motive, rather than technical identity of cause of
action or title, is the test"
39. Bartlett v. Kansas Pub. Serv. Co., 349 Mo. 13, 160 S. V 2d 740(1942). Professor Morgan has referred to this case as "a sensible extension
of the established rule." Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 Harv.
L. Rev. 481, 552 (1946).
Professor Falknor, while conceding the irrationality of the mutuality prn-
ciple, questions the wisdom of dispending with the requirement of identity of
opponent Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U. C. L A.
L. Rev. 43, 58 (1954).
40. 171 Minn. 216, 213 N. W. 902 (1927).
41. Id. at 218, 219, 213 N. AV. at 903.
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Clause (b) will be discussed first since it is a codification of the
well established "excited utterances" exception. It is based on the
belief that considerations of self-interest are suspended at times of
physical or mental shock so that statements made under these cir-
cumstances are likely to be true. It has long been accepted by the
Minnesota Court with the following requirements .42
"To render the statement admissible, there must be'a start-
ling occasion, that is, some shock startling enough to produce
nervous excitement and to render the utterance spontaneous and
instinctive, the statement must be -made before there is time
or opportunity to design or contrive or devise anything to the
speaker's own advantage and while the nervous excitement still
dominates the reflective power, that is, the mental shock must
extend without interruption from the moment of the event to
the moment of the statement or exclamation, the language must
relate to the circumstances which prompted it."
Clause (a) dispenses with the requirement of a "startling event"
so long as the statement was spontaneous and accompanied percep-
tion. Contemporaneity is the essential thing. Professor Morgan, the
leading advocate of this exception, has explained its rationale as
follows .1'
"What substitutes for the oath and cross-examination can be
found to give it reliability? A statement by a person as to ex-
ternal events then and there being perceived by his senses is
worthy of credence for two reasons. First, it is in essence a
declaration of a presently existing state of mind, for it is
nothing more than an assertion of his presently existing sense
impressions. As such it has the quality of spontaneity Sec-
ond, since the statement is contemporaneous with the event, it
is made at the place of the event. Consequently the event is open
to perception by the senses of the person to whom the declara-
tion is made and by whom it is usually reported on the witness
stand. The witness is subject to cross-examination concerning
that event as well as the fact and content of the utterance, so
that the extra-judicial statement does not depend solely upon
the credit of the declarant. Unless exact contemporaneousness is
insisted upon, the first of these guaranties is partially lacking and
the second is weakened. Therefore no such amplification of the
definition of contemporaneous can be tolerated. It is to be
noted that the spontaneity of the utterance is warranted by its
contemporaneousness with the event and by the presence of
another capable of observing the phenomena which the declarant
is reporting. Consequently it is not at all essential that the event
42. Lambrecht v. Schreyer, 129 Minn. 271, 275, 152 N. W 645, 646
(1915). See also the excellent discussion in Note, 22 Minn. L. Rev. 391
(1938)
43. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as
Res Gestae, 31 Yale L. J. 229, 236, 237 (1922).
[Vol. 40:455
THE HEARSAY RULE
should be of startling or exciting nature or that it should shock
or alarm the declarant."
No Minnesota case has been found recognizing this proposed excep-
tion and it has been recognized by only a minority of courts.'4
Clause (c) would admit a hearsay statement made by an un-
available declarant 5 if the judge finds that it was made at a time
when the event or condition "had been recently perceived by him
and while his recollection was clear, and was made in good faith
prior to the commencement of the action."
In 1898, Massachusetts passed a statute providing for the ad-
missibility of declarations of deceased persons. The te.x-t of the
statute, as amended in 1943, is quoted below. 6 A survey, conducted
in 1922 by the Commonwealth Fund Research Committee, as to
the operation of the statute showed overwhelmingly favorable re-
sults. The committee concluded that it "has given rise to virtually no
technical trouble and stands today as endorsed by forty years of
trial experience.1 47
Clause (c) is broader than the Massachusetts statute in that
unavailability for any reason mentioned in Rule 62(7) is a basis
for admissibility whereas the Massachusetts statute is limited to
declarations of deceased persons. Furthermore the Massachusetts
statute is applicable only in civil proceedings while the proposed rule
would apply in both criminal and civil actions. On the other hand,
the proposed rule requires that the statement shall have been made
before the commencement of the action, a requirement eliminated
from the Massachusetts statute m 1943.
In the comments to clause (c) it is stated that "there is a vital
44. Annot, 140 A. L. R. 874 (1942) ; see Note, 46 Column. L. Rev. 430
(1946). The application of the exception is well illustrated by Houston Oxy-
gen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161 S. W. 2d 474 (1942), which concerned a
collision between an automobile driven by plaintiff and the defendant's truck.
A witness testified that, as plaintiff's car passed hers on the highway, she
remarked to her companions, "they must have been drunk . . we would find
them somewhere on the road wrecked if they kept up that rate of speed." The
court held the statement admissible, reasoning that it was sufficiently spon-
taneous to afford little time to forget or fabricate, and that one is unlikely to
misstate a fact to another who has reasonable opportunity to observe it.
45. The definition of "unavailability" contained in Rule 62(7) is quoted
at length in note 34, supra. Falknor criticizes this rule as not making it clear
that there must be a judicial determination of unavailability. Falkmor, The
Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptiots, 2 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 43, 64 (1954). It
seems to this writer that-the rule and the comments thereto do make it clear.
46. "In any action or other civil judicial proceeding, a declaration of a
deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay . . if the
court finds that it was made in good faith and upon the personal knowledge
of the declarant." Mass. Ann. Laws c. 233, § 65 (Supp. 1953).
47. Morgan, The Law of Evidence: Some Proposals for Its Reform, c. 4
(1927). See also concurring opinion of Chief Justice Vanderbilt in Robertson
v. Hackensack Trust Co., 1 N. J. 304, 63 A. 2d 515 (1949).
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need for a provision such as this to prevent miscarriage of justice
resulting from the arbitrary exclusion of evidence which is worthy
of consideration, when it is the best evidence available." Although
no reference is made to specific types of cases it is clear that this ex-
tension of the exception is most needed when a claim for work-
men's compensation or for accident insurance benefits rests upon a
mortal injury observed only by the person injured.
There is still another justification for the exception created in
clause (c) Rule 7, which abolishes all general disqualifications of
witnesses,48 would nullify existing dead man's statutes, 49 by making
all interested persons competent to testify in suits involving trans-
actions with deceased persons, the same as they are in other suits.
Clause (c) attains mutuality of testimony by admitting the de-
cedent's version of the transaction in the form of hearsay declara-
tions to refute the claims of the survivor.
Clause (c) would not drastically affect Minnesota law, at least
in Workmen's Compensation cases. In Jacobs v. Village of Buhl,0
a statement by deceased to a fellow-employee, made about 45
minutes after the accident, saying that he had fallen that evening,
was held admissible as part of the res gestae. The court said "I'
" to give a strict application of the res gestae rule in com-
pensation cases would defeat the intent of the workmen's com-
pensation law The purpose of that law is to make each industry
take the burden of caring for the casualties caused in its opera-
tions. We cannot limit this purpose to cases in which employees
who have died from injuries sustained in the line of duty can
produce an eyewitness to their accidental injuries. This would
defeat both the letter and spirit of the compensation law
It is natural that an injured person would be occupied and
absorbed by the experience of his recent injury and that he would
make a statement relative thereto to the first fellow employee
that he happened to meet. Such a declaration would, in the ordi-
nary run of life, be accepted as a true statement of what occurred.
We should not set up technical rules to exclude as evidence what
would be accepted as true in the ordinary run of life."
48. Rule 7 provides as follows
"Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, (a) every person is
qualified to be a witness, and (b) no person has a privilege to refuse to be
a witness, and (c) no person is. disqualified to testify to any matter, and
(d) no person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter or to pro-
duce any object or writing, and (e) no person has a privilege that an-
other shall not be a witness or shall not disclose any matter or shall not
produce any object or writing, and (f) all relevant evidence is admissible."
49. Minn. Stat. § 585.04 (1953).
50. 199 Minn. 572, 273 N. W 245 (1937), Note, 22 Minn. L. Rev. 391(1938).
51. Jacobs v. Village of Buhl, 199 Minn. 572, 577, 581-82, 273 N. W 245,
248, 250 (1937).
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Clause (c) is carefully safeguarded by specifying the findings
the judge must make before admitting the statements and these ap-
pear to afford sufficient assurance of trustworthiness to permit their
use in other types of litigation as well as Workmen's Compensation
cases.
Dying Declarations
Rule 63(5) would make admissible
"A statement by a person unavailable as a witness because of
his death if the judge finds that it was made voluntarily and in
good faith and while the declarant was conscious of his impend-
ing death and believed that there was no hope of his recovery."
This expands the existing exception which limits the use of
dying declarations to criminal prosecutions for the homicide of the
declarant. The proposed rule would admit them, not only in any
criminal prosecution but in any civil action as well. Minnesota ap-
pears to follow the traditional restriction 32 Under this presently
prevailing rule, dying declarations are admissible only insofar as
they relate to the circumstances of the killing, i.e., the res gestae of
the killing. Under this limitation declarations about previous
quarrels between the accused and his victim are excluded.5 3 The
proposed rule would apparently admit any statement relevant to
any issue in the case.
Orthodox doctrine rejects a dying declaration if it appears that
the declarant did not have adequate opportunity to observe the facts
recounted. 54 The proposed rule imposes no such requirements of
personal knowledge55 and I quite agree with Professor Falknor's
criticism that the exception should be revised to make this explicit. 50
52. State v. Brown, 209. Minn. 478, 296 N. W 582 (1941), State v.
Pere, 56 Min. 226, 57 N. W. 652, rehearing den., 56 Minn. 239, 57 N. W.
1065 (1894).
53. -McCormick, Evidence 558 (1954). See also State v. Elias, 205 Minn.
156, 158, 285 N. W. 475, 476 (1939) ("... declarations .. as to the cause of
his injury or as to the circumstances which resulted in the injury .").
54. McCormick, Evidence 558 (1954).
55. Compare Rule 63"(4) (c) requiring that the declarant had "recently
perceived", the event or condition.
As Professor Falknor points out there is considerable overlapping be-
tween Rule 63(4) (c) and Rule 63(5). "The prncipal points of variation seem
to be these: Rule 63(5) does not require, as does Rule 63(4) (c), a finding
of 'recency' of observation or 'clear recollection' when the statement was
made, or that the statement have been made ante litem indtam; on the other
hand, Rule 63(5) requires, as the other rule does not, that the declarant, to
his knowledge, was m a dying condition when the statement was made. It is
to be remembered that Rule 63(4) (c) is to be applicable in criminal as well
as in civil actions. Rule 2. Accordingly, the necessity of Rule 63(5) may be
questionable." Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U. L. C. A.
L. Rev. 43, 65 n. 74 (1954).
56. Id. at 67.
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It has been well argued that the opinion rule should not be ap-
plicable to a dying declaration for the reason that it is now impossible
to obtain from the declarant the detailed facts observed by him, that
the opinion rule, designed as a regulation of the form of questioning
a witness in court, is inappropriate as a restriction upon out-of-
court statements.57 However, most courts and apparently Minne-
sota5s apply the opinion rule. Rule 56, dealing with the opinion rule,
seems to be limited to testimony in court. Since the same problem
arises in connection with other exceptions to the hearsay rule the
definition of "Statement" in Rule 62(1) should be revised to include
expressions of opinion.
Confessins
Rule 63 (6) would make admissible
"In a criminal proceeding as against the accused, a previous
statement by him relative to the offense charged if, and only if,
the judge finds that the accused when making the statement was
conscious and was capable of understanding what he said and
did, and that he was not induced to make the statement (a)
under compulsion or by infliction or threats of infliction of
suffenng upon him or another, or by prolonged interrogation
under such circumstances as to render the statement involuntary,
or (b) by threats or promises concerning action to be taken by
a public official with reference to the crime, likely to cause the
accused to make such a statement falsely, and made by a person
whom the accused reasonably believed to have the power or
authority to execute the same."
This rule appears to conform to existing Minnesota law on con-
fessions. Clause (a) would exclude a confession induced by infliction
or threats of infliction of "suffering" upon the accused "or another."
In the early case of State v Staley,59 the court stated that the "rule
seems well settled, that if any advantage is held out, or harm
threatened, of a temporal or worldly nature, by a person in author-
ity, the confession induced thereby must be excluded." Although
no case has been found dealing with threats to "another" the theory
of the Staley case and the tenor of the statute relating to confes-
sions6 0 would seem to include them. The comments to the rule seem
to limit the phrase "another" to members of the declarant's family
The rule itself makes no such limitation. It would seem that a threat
57 McCormick, EVidence 559 (1954) , 5 Wigmore § 1447
58. State v. Mueller, 122 Minn. 91,141 N. W 1113 (1913)
59. 14 Minn. (Gil. 75, 79 80) 105, 110 (1869)
60. See Minn. Stat. § 34.03 (1953) "A confession of the defendant
shall not be given in evidence against him whether made in the course
of judicial proceedings or to a private person when made under the influence
of fear produced by threats."
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to a confederate not a member of the declarant's family should fall
within the ban.
Clause (a) would also exclude a confession obtained "by pro-
longed interrogation under such circumstances as to render the
statement involuntary." The comment states that this provision is
designed to "bring the exception more in line with Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944)." This would also appear to be in
accord with Minnesota law in view of the decision in Slate v.
Scluzbert.61
Although Rule 63(6) is entitled "Confessions" the text refers
to "a previous statement by him relative to the offense charged."
This raises the question of the difference between a confession and
an admission. "A confession is a complete acknowledgment of guilt
of the criiie on trial. An admission is any other statement of a fact,
relevant to the charge, made by the accused and offered against him
as evidence of the fact." 62 Two additional problems arise, one of sub-
stance and one of procedure. The first is whether an involuntary
admission should be treated the same as an involuntary confession
and excluded from evidence. Whether the rationale of the rule
excluding involuntary confessions be the deterrence of unlawful
police practices or the untrustworthiness of the confession there
seems to be no reason for treating involuntary admissions any dif-
ferently. It must be admitted, however, that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the due process clause does not make it clear that
both be excluded.63
61. 218 Minn. 1, 15 N. V. 2d 585 (1944). Defendant in a homicide case
was a feeble-minded woman who had been arrested and held incommunicado
for over two days prior to arraignment. Her requests for her parents, lawyer,
priest and doctor were not complied with. The confession admitted in evi-
dence was obtained on the second day, after extensive and repeated question-
ing. The court held there was a violation of due process.
For an excellent discussion of the Supreme Court cases involving the
use of confessions in state criminal trials, see Paulsen, The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 411 (1954). For a discus-
sion of some of the problems arising when the lie-detector or drugs are used,
see Dession & Associates, Drug-Induced Revelation and Criminal Investiga-
tion, 62 Yale L. J. 315 (1953).
62. McCormick, Evidence 234 (1954). See also State v. Mims, 26 Minn.
183, 26 N. W. 683 (1879), 6 Minn. L. Rev. 524 (1922).
63. Compare Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 3-7 U. S. 274 (1946) (must be ex-
cluded), with Stem v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, 162 n. 5 (1953) ("Although
New York may impose the same requirements for admissibility of an admis-
sion as it does a confession . . such utterances are not usually subject to the
same restrictions on admissibility as are confessions.. . In the face of the
weight of authority to the contrary, it cannot be said than any such require-
ment is imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
See also Notes, "Involuntary Adiussios Should Not Be Competent Eu-
dence," 19 Temple L. Q. 485 (1946), Validity of the Admisson-Confession
Distinction for Purposes of Admzssibility, 39 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 743
(1949).
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On the procedural side, when the state offers a confession the
defendant may object on the ground that it has not been shown to
have been voluntary and, if he does, the state has the duty of
producing proof of voluntariness in a preliminary hearing where
the defendant may offer counter-evidence.0 4 Should the state have
the same burden if the accused objects to the offer of an admission
on the ground of involuntariness? Professor McCormick argues
that in this situation the accused should have the burden of produc-
ing evidence of undue pressure since an admission is usually less
damaging to him and less likely to have been induced by undue
pressure.65 But this is not necessarily the case. McCormick himself
admits that "admissions range from those which are as persuasive
of guilt as a confession itself would be and those which merely
acknowledge subordinate facts not crucial to the state, which could
usually find other evidence of the fact.""0 In either event, it would
seem that the burden of persuasion on the issue of voluntariness
should rest on the state. In the first instance because of the affinity
to a confession, in the latter because of the state's superior access to
the relevant evidence.07
Admissions
The comments to Rule 63(7) (8) and (9) recite that they adopt
the policy of Model Code Rules 506, 507 and 508. Reference, there-
fore, to the comments of its draftsmen will be helpful in considering
the Uniform Rules dealing with admissions.0 8
(1) Personal Admissions.
Rule 63(7) would admit
"As against himself a statement by a person who is a party
to the action in his individual or representative capacity and if
the latter, who was acting in such representative capacity in
making the statement."
The draftsmen of the Model Code in commenting upon Rule
50669 say
"This states the common law rule as to admissions made by
a party personally While a few dicta may be found to the effect
64. McCormick, Evidence 235 (1954). And see State v. Schabert, 218
Minn. 1, 15 N. W 2d 585 (1944), discussing the allocation of responsibility
between judge and jury.
65. McCormick, Evidence 235 (1954).
66. Ibid.
67 For a penetrating discussion see Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions:
The Allocation of Responsibility between Judge and Jury, 21 U. Clu. L. Rev.
317 (1954).
68. For a general discussion see Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to
the Hearsay Rule, 30 Yale L. J. 355 (1921), Admissions, 1 U. C. L. A.
L. Rev. 18 (1953).
69. Model Code of Evidence 245, 246 (1942).
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that an admission is receivable only as impeaching evidence, the
decisions are almost unanimous that it is admissible also as
tending to prove the truth of the matter stated in it Further-
more, it is received where testimony by the admitter as a wit-
ness would be rejected because of lack of personal knowledge.
The Rule excluding opinion is likewise usually held to have no
application."
In Minnesota, an admission is treated as "substantive" and
"affirmative" evidence.70 Although personal knowledge by the de-
clarant is not required as a prerequisite to admissibility,7' he must
have had minimal powers of recollection and narration. " On the
other hand, the opinion rule is apparently applicable to admissions.T3
But the opinion rule should not apply to out-of-court statements that
are usually made without thought of form. In the courtroom counsel
may reframe questions to meet an opinion objection. If applied to
out-of-court statements the effect is exclusion. It should be noted
that it is the reference to the comments to the Model Code which
would make the opinion rule inapplicable. The Uniform Rules
themselves are not clear on this.
As pointed out before, the term "statement" includes non-
verbal conduct as well as verbal. Such conduct if intended as a
substitute for words and if offered to prove the truth of what is
asserted is hearsay. If offered against a party it falls within the
admissions exception. For example, evidence of flight by the de-
fendant is admissible.7 4 Other conduct which might be considered
an admission is specifically excluded by the rules because of over-
riding policies. Thus, Rule 51 excludes evidence of subsequent re-
pairs when offered to,prove negligence.75 Rule 52 excludes evidence
of offers to compromise.7
70. Aide v. Taylor, 214 Minn. 212, 7 N. W. 2d 757 (1953) ; Litman r.
Peper, 214 Minn. 127, 7 N. W 2d 334 (1943); Boyea v. Bauer, 211 Minn.
140, 300 N. W. 451 (1941) ; Williams v. Jayne, 210 Minn. 594, 299 N. V.
853 (1941).
71. Binewicz v. Haglin, 103 Minn. 297, 115 N. W. 271 (1908). This view
is followed by the majority of courts on the theory that when a man speaks
against his own interest it is supposed that he has made an adequate investi-
gation and informed himself. McCormick, Evidence 507 (1954).
72. Ammundson v. Falk, 228 Minn. 115, 36 N. W 2d 521 (1949), Aide
v. Taylor, 214 Minn. 212, 7 N. W. 2d 757 (1943).
73. Albertson v. Chicago R. R., 64 N. AV. 2d 175 (Minn. 1954),
Binewicz v. Haglin, 103 Minn. 297, 115 N. W. 271 (1908).
74. State v. McTague, 190 Minn. 449, 252 N. W 446 (1934) ; see note
15, supra.
75. Lunde v. National Citizens Bank, 213 Minn. 278, 6 N. WV. 2d 809
(1942); Morse v. Minneapolis & St L. Ry., 30 Miin. 465, 16 N. AV.
358 (1883).
76. Esser v. Brophey, 212 Minn. 194, 3 N. W 2d 3 (1942). See also
Schliro v. Raymond, 237 Minn. 271, 54 N. W. 2d 329 (1952). And see Minn.
R. Civ. P., Rule 68.01 and Rule 68.02.
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(2) Authorized and Adoptive Admissions.
Rule 63 (8) would admit as against a party a statement
"(a) by a person authorized by the party to make a statement or
statements for him concerning the subject of the statement, or
(b) of which the party with knowledge of the content thereof
has, by words or other conduct, manifested his adoption or his
belief in its truth."
Clause (a) is a generally accepted extension of the admissions
exception. 77 Clause (b), likewise, states the orthodox rule on "adop-
tive" admissions. Of course, if one expressly adopts another's state-
ment as his own there is an explicit admission and the situation
should be treated as an authorized admission discussed in clause
(a) Clause (b), however, deals with more ambiguous conduct.
The question of adoption often arises in suits on life and accident
policies when the insurance company offers against the beneficiary
the statements which the beneficiary has attached to the proof of
death or disability, such as the statements of the attending physi-
cian. 8
If a statement is made by another person in the presence of a
party to the action and it contain assertions which, if untrue, the
party would under all the circumstances reasonably be expected to
deny, his failure to speak is circumstantial evidence that he believes
the statement to be true and his conduct is an adoptive admission.
This is especially serious in the case of a person suspected of crime
who is confronted with accusations or statements of others implicat-
ing him.79 It seems particularly unjust to admit evidence of silence
when the suspect is under arrest, because of a common belief that
77 Model Code of Evidence 246 (1942).
78. In Laury v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 180 Minn. 205, 212,
213, 230 N. W 648, 651, 652, aff'd on rehearing, 180 Minn. 215, 231 N. W
824 (1930) the court said.
"The law is well settled that proofs of death are admissible in an
action to recover on the policy and may be used as admissions against
the plaintiff, the beneficiary, even though the statements therein con-
tained did not come to the plaintiff's knowledge. The statements therein
found are not conclusive, they may be explained and even contradicted,
but are admissible for what they may be worth in view of the other
testimony.
Although an attending physician's statements in the proofs of death,
presented by the beneficiary in an insurance policy, may be used as ad-
missions against interest, still, when such statements on their face show
that they are pure hearsay and the evidence discloses that the beneficiary
neither knew of the hearsay part nor authorized anyone to report the
hearsay to the physician, the insurer should not be heard to claim them to
be evidence tending to establish as facts that which some unauthorized
party told the attending physician."
See also Elness v. Prudential Insurance Co., 190 Minn. 169, 251 N. NV 183
(1933).
79. State v. Postal, 215 Minn. 427, 10 N. W 2d 373 (1943) , State v.
Rediker, 214 Minn. 470, 8 N. W 2d 527 (1943), State v. Quirk, 101 Minn.
334, 112 N. W 409 (1907).
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one need say nothing; in addition there is a natural reluctance to
get involved in a word-battle with accusers and the police. 0
(3) Vicarious Admissions.
Rule 63(9) provides that as against a party there shall be
admissible,
"a statement which would be admissible if made by the declarant
at the hearing of (a) the statement concerned a matter within
the scope of an agency or employment of the declarant for the
party and was made before the terrrination of such relationship,
or (b) the party and the declarant were participating in a plan
to commit a crime or a civil wrong and the statement was rele-
vant to the plan or its subject matter and was made while the
plan was in existence and before its complete execution or other
termination, or (c) one of the issues between the party and the
proponent of the evidence of the statement is a legal liability of
the declarant, and the statement tends to establish that liability."
Minnesota adheres to the usual rule that admissions by an agent
made within the scope of his authority are binding on the princi-
pal,"' but they must be statements of fact and not mere conclusions
or opinions.8 2 It should be noted that clause (a) extends traditional
doctrine in the following manner a
"... [W]hereas present orthodox doctrine requires a showing
of 'speaking' authority, the proposed rule, in effect, implies such
an'authority in respect to any declaration concerning or de-
scribing authorized conduct, if made before the termination of
the agency. Thus, in the typical accident case, the rule would
make admissible, as against defendant, any subsequent state-
ment of the driver of his car concerning the circumstances of
the accident, if the declarant was authorized to drive, and if the
statement was made before his employment was terminated."
80. But see State-v. Brown, 209 Minn. 478, 482, 296 N. W 582, 585
(1941) (dictum: "There is high authority for the proposition that the mere
fact of arrest renders inadmissible a defendant's silence in the face of
accusatory statements made in his presence and hearing. The arrest is
deemed to place such restraint on the accussed as to destroy the basis for an
inference of acquiescence by silence or failure to controvert")
See also State v. Gulbrandsen, 238 Minn. 508, 57 N. W. 2d 419 (1953).
This problem is considered in 29 N. Y.'U. L. Rev. 1266 (1954) ; 15 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 376 (1954).
The Minnesota court has also held that under certain circumstances,
failure to reply to a letter may constitute an adoptive admission. Sonnesyn v.
Hawbaker, 127 Minn. 15, 148 N. W. 476 (1914). See McCormuck, Evidence
531 (1954).
81. Rosenberger v. H. E. Wilcox Motor Co., 145 Minn. 408, 177 N. WV.
625 (1920). Minnesota has also enacted the Uniform Partnership Act, which
makes the admission of a partner concerning partnership affairs within the
scope of his authority, admissible against the partnership. Minn. Stat. § 323.10(1953).
82. Albertson v. Chicago R. R., 64 N. V. 2d 175 (Minn. 1954); Smith
v. The Emporium Mercantile Co., 190 Minn. 294, 251 N. W. 265 (1933).
83. Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U. C. L. A.
L. Rev. 43, 71. See also McCormick, Evidence, 519 (1954).
1956]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEWo"
Many courts have reached the same result by applying the so-called
res gestae doctrine,8 4 and this has been true on at least one occasion
in Minnesota. In Linderoth v. Kieffer" post-accident admissions of
a driver were held admissible against his employer
"Although they cannot be regarded as authorized, the decla-
rations and admissions of an agent or servant may be put in
evidence whenever they constitute part of the res gestae. Their
admissibility does not necessarily depend on the law of agency
They are received under a rule of evidence which is as applicable
in a proper case to one not an agent at all as to one who was
an agent."' 6
Clause (b) extends slightly the admissibility of co-conspirators'
admissions, since it allows in any statement "relevant to the plan
or its subject matter and made while the plan was in existence
and before its complete execution or other termination." Minne-
sota doctrine is in line with this insofar as it bars statements made
after the conspiracy is over.87 But most of the Minnesota cases also
require, as do many jurisdictions, that the statements themselves
be in furtherance of the conspiracy, the "common purpose" or the
"common design."'8 This would not be necessary under the pro-
posed rule. 8
Declaration Against Interest
Orthodox doctrine requires that two main conditions be met
before this exception to the hearsay rule is satisfied first, the decla-
ration must state facts which are against the pecuniary or pro-
prietary interest of the declarant at the time made, second, the de-
clarant must be unavailable at the time of trial.9 0 Rule 63(10)
broadens considerably this exception. It makes admissible not only
statements by a declarant against pecuniary or proprietary interest
but also those which the judge finds
"so far subjected him to civil or criminal liability or so far
rendered invalid a claim by him against another or created such
risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule or social dis-
approval in the community that a reasonable man in his posi-
tion would not have made the statement unless he believed it to
be true."
84. Model Code of Evidence 250 (1952).
85. 162 Minn. 440, 203 N. W 415 (1925).
86. Id. at 443, 203 N. W at 416.
87 State v. Sweeney, 180 Minn. 450, 231 N. W 225 (1930).
88. State v. Lyons, 144 Minn. 348, 175 N. W 689 (1919) , State v.
Dunn, 140 Minn. 308, 168 N. W 2 (1918), Nicolay v. Mallery, 62 Minn. 119,
64 N. W 108 (1895). See also State v. Kahner, 217 Minn. 574, 15 N. W 2d
105 (1944).
89. Model Code of Evidence 250 (1942).
90. For able general discussions see Morgan, Declaration Against
Interest, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 451 (1952) , Jefferson, Declarations Against Inter-
est: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1944).
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The theory of trustworthiness upon which this exception rests is
that a person will not concede even to himself the existence of a fact
which will cause him substantial harm unless he believes that the
'fact does exist. If this theory is plausible there seems no valid rea-
son for not extending the exception to include statements against
penal interest 9' and those which would subject the declarant to
hatred, ridicule, contempt or social ostracism. As Professor Morgan
puts it, "it requires no argument to convince that the realization of
such a consequence is generally a much more powerful influence
upon conduct than the realization of legal responsibility for a sum
of money." 92
Although Minnesota has thus far adhered to the majority rule
limiting the exception to statements against pecuniary and pro-
prietary interest, it has given a liberal interpretation to pecuniary
interest by including acknowledgment of facts which would give
rise to a liability for unliquidated damages for tort.93
Another substantial change which Rule 63(10) proposes is the
elimination of the unavailability requirement. The reasoning which
admits the admissions of a party; excited utterances, and the decla-
rations of present mental or bodily state, without regard to avail-
ability seems equally applicable to declarations against interest.
The theory dispensing with unavailability as a prerequisite to their
admission, is that they are just as credible and trustworthy as testi-
mony on the witness stand would be. Hence there is no necessity for
showing the declarant to be unavailable as a wvitness.91
Statement of Physical or Mental Condition of Declarant
Rule 63 (12) would admit
"Unless the judge finds it was made in bad faith, a statement of
the declarant's (a) then existing state of mind, emotion or
physical sensation, including statementd of intent, plan, motive,
design, mental feeling, pain and bodily health, but not including
memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed, when
such a mental or physical condition is in issue or is relevant to
prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant, or (b) previous
symptoms, pain or physical sensation, made to a physician con-
91. See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 272 (1913) (Holmes,
Lurton, and Hughes, J.J., dissenting) ; State v. Voges, 197 Minn. 85. 89, 266
N. W 265, 267 (1936) (Hilton, J., dissenting), Note, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 181(1937). See also In re Forsythe, 221 Minn. 303, 312, n. 3, 22 N. W. 2d 19,
25, n. 3 (1946).
92. Morgan, Declaration Against Interest, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 451, 475(1952).
93. Halvorsen v. Moon & Kerr Lumber Co., 87 Minn. 18. 91 N. NV. 28
(1902). See also Windorski v. Doyle, 219 Minn. 402, 18 N. IV. 2d 142 (1945).
94. Model Code -of Evidence 258 (1942).
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sulted for treatment or for diagnosis with a view to treatment,
and relevant to an issue of declarant's bodily condition."
Inasmuch as this exception is perhaps the most complex and
difficult of all it will be discussed according to Professor Mc-
Cormick's textual arrangement of the problem."'
(1) Declarations of bodily condition.
That declarations of present bodily condition and symptoms,
including pain and other feelings, are admissible to evidence the
facts asserted, is a well established exception to the hearsay rule. 0
Since they describe an existing condition and are probably sincere
their spontaneous quality gives them a special reliability Indeed,
their spontaneity is thought to give them a greater probative value
than present testimony from the witness stand. Under the prevailing
view these declarations are received even though made to members
of the family, friends or other persons.97 A fortiori, statements of
presently existing condition made by a patient to a doctor consulted
for treatment are almost universally admitted as evidence of the
facts stated.98 Although these statements are likely to be less spon-
taneous than those made to friends and relatives since they are
usually given in response to questions, they have the added factor
of reliability that the patient knows that the kind of treatment he
will receive and its value may depend largely upon the accuracy of
the information he gives the doctor.9" That portion of clause (a)
dealing with existing physical conditions is in accord with generally
accepted doctrine.
The situation in Minnesota is, however, rather obscure and
vague. Three early decisions recognized the general doctrine that
statements of existing physical condition are admissible to whom-
soever made.' However, in 1897, the supreme court undertook a
careful analysis of this problem and made a number of distinc-
tions.101 First of all, a distinction was made between ejaculatory
utterances "which are the spontaneous manifestations of distress, and
which naturally and instinctively accompany and furnish evidence
of existing suffering" and "mere descriptive statements of pain.
95. McCormick, Evidence 561-578 (1954).
96. Northern Pac. R. R. v. Urlin, 158 U. S. 271 (1895) , McCormick,
Evidence 561 (1954) , 6 Wigmore § 1714.
97 McCormick, Evidence 562 (1954).
98. McCormick, Evidence 563 (1954)
99. Ibid.
100. Firkins v. Chicago G. W Ry., 61 Minn. 31, 63 N. W 172 (1895),
Johnson v. Northern Pac. R. R., 47 Minn. 430, 50 N. W 473 (1891) , Holly v.
Bennett, 46 Minn. 386, 49 N. W 189 (1891).
101. Williams v. Great No. Ry., 68 Minn. 55, 70 N. W 860 (1897) See
also Berg v. Ullevig, 70 N. W 2d 133 (Minn. 1955)
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or other subjective symptoms of a malady which furnish no intrinsic
evidence of their existence.' 02 It is only the first type of statement
that is admissible to whomsoever made. Descriptive or narrative
statements, on the other hand, are admissible only under the follow-
ing circumstances :103
"First, they must have been made to a medical attendant
for the purposes of medical treatment. Second, they must relate
to existing pain or other symptoms from which the patient is
suffering at the time, and must not relate to past transactions or
symptoms, however, closely related to the present sickness. ..
Third, such statements are admissible only when the medical
attendant is called upon to give an expert opinion based in part
on them. He cannot merely testify to the statements, and then
stop. In the absence of any expert opinion based on the state-
ments, they stand on the same footing as if made to a nonexpert
witness."
This distinction between ejaculatory and narrative expressions
is a most difficult one to administer. It is often impossible to dis-
tinguish rationally between an inarticulate cry or groan and a state-
ment such as: "That hurts." "The warrant for the admission of both
is the same; the lack of opportunity or motive for fabrication upon
an unexpected occasion to wich the declarant responds imme-
diately, and without reflection." °'0'
The further restriction that narrative statements of existing
symptoms to a doctor are admissible only when the doctor is called
upon to give an expert opinion based in part on them is also difficult
to justify. Inasmuch as treatment will depend in part upon what is
disclosed, the patient has the best of motives to disclose the truth.
Indeed, it is doubtful whether the hearsay rule is applicable at all.
If the statements are presented merely as a basis for an expert
opinion, they are not evidence of the matter stated but merely ex-
planatory of the opimon, enabling the jury to weigh it in the light of
its basis.10 5
The argument that a patient's statements made in consultation
for treatment have a special reliability is a strong one and has in-
duced some courts to extend the scope of the hearsay exception to
include statements of past symptoms, when made to a doctor for
treatment 08 This is the view of clause (b) of Rule 63(12). How-
102. Williams v. Great No. Ry., 68 Minn. 55, 59, 60, 70 N. W 860,
862 (1897).
103. Id. at 61, 62, 70 N. W at 863. See also Berg v. Ullevig, 70 N. W
2d 133 (Minn. 1955).
104. See Meaney v. United States, 112 F. 2d 538, 539 (2d Cir. 1940)
(opinion by L. Hand, J.).
105. 6 Wigmore § 1720.
106. Meaney v. United States, 112 F. 2d 538 (2d Cir. 1940).
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ever, this would change Minnesota law The Minnesota court has
consistently held that a doctor is not permitted to testify to state-
ments of past symptoms, "however closely these may be related to
the present sickness or the present suffering from the injury.' 10 7
Many courts draw a sharp line between physicians consulted for
treatment and those consulted solely as prospective expert witnesses.
Special restrictions are frequently imposed as to the latter. In Miii-
nesota, descriptive statements of neither past nor present physical
pains and symptoms are admissible as substantive evidence and, ill
addition, the expert is barred from giving an opinion based upon
past history recounted to him. 0 8 The preliminary requirement in
Rule 63(12) that the judge find that the statement was made in
good faith would seem to give more desirable flexibility of decision
that the rigid restrictions now imposed.
(2) Declarations of Mental State.
The portion of clause (a) referring to an existing state of mind
recognizes an exception that was an outgrowth of the exception for
declarations of existing physical condition. As with the latter, the
special reliability lies in their spontaneity and probable sincerity
The substantive law often makes the existence of a state of mind an
operative fact upon which a cause of action or defense depends.
When an existing state of mind is thus an issue in the case, declara-
tions describing it are freely admitted.100 But the exception is not
restricted to statements of a then-existing state of mind. It may
be used as a basis of inferring its continuance into the future or its
existence in the past. For example, in Troseth v. Troseth,"0 declara-
tions of the grantor in a deed made both before and after its date
were admissible on the issue of delivery
Clause (a) would also permit statements of intention to be used
as a basis for inferring subsequent conduct of the declarant. The
107 Berg v. Ullevig, 70 N. W 2d 133, 138 (Minn. 1955). See also
Sund v. Chicago Ry., 164 Minn. 24, 204 N. W 628 (1925), Edlund v. St.
Paul City Ry., 78 Minn. 434, 81 N. W 214 (1899), Williams v. Great No.
Ry., 68 Minn. 55, 70 N. W 860 (1897).
108. Preveden v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 Minn. 523, 274 N. V
685 (1937) , Faltico v. Minneapolis Street Ry., 198 Minn. 88, 268 N. \V 857
(1936), Sund v. Chicago Ry., 164 Minn. 24, 204 N. W 628 (1925)
However, the hypothetical question may afford an escape from these re-
strictions. Lee v. Minneapolis Street Ry., 230 Minn. 315, 41 N. W 2d 433
(1950) , Berg v. Ullevig, 70 N. W 2d 133 (Minn. 1955).
109. McCormick, Evidence 568 (1954). And see Rockwell v. Rockwell,
181 Minn. 13, 231 N. W 718 (1930) (action for alienation of affections.
Letters between spouses admissible to show the state of affection between
them).
110. 224 Minn. 35, 28 N. W 2d 65 (1947). Other examples are given in
McCormick, Evidence, 568 (1954).
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leading case on this point is Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hill-
mon," where the defense to an action on a policy on the life of
Hillmon was that Hillmon was not dead but that the body claimed
to be his was that of one' Walters. On this issue, it was held that
letters of Walters to his family announcing his intention of going as
an employee with Hillmon to the locality where the body was later
actually found, were admissible. - The Minnesota Court has fol-
lowed the Hillnon doctrine in a number of cases. 13
If declarations of an existing state of mind are receivable to
show later acts, are they admissible to show previous conduct? The
same court that decided the Hilnton case has given a negative
answer.- Clause (a) apparently accepts this same view by spe-
cifically excepting "memory or belief to prove the fact remembered
or believed." However, the comments to the clause are ambiguous.
They refer to the hesitation to infer an antecedent condition but
recognize that '"in multitudes of wills cases dealing with issues of
revocation and undue influence the evidence is received." This is
certainly an accurate description of existing law. In will cases, for
example, it is generally established that a testator's statements made
after the alleged event are admissible to show that he has or has
not-made a will, or a will of a particular purport, or has or has not
revoked his will." 5 It is not clear just what clause (a) would do
to these decisions.
111. 145 U. S. 285 (1892). See, Maguire, The Hilimon Case-Thirty-
Three Years After, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 709 (1925).
112. Clause (a) is perhaps narrower than the Hilhion doctrine since
the statement is limited to proving or explaining the conduct of the declarant.
In Hillnon the letters of Waiters not only permitted an inference that Walters
went to Crooked Creek but that he went with and was accompanied by
Hillmon.
113. E.g., State v. Hayward, 62 Minn. 474, 65 N. V. 63 (1895) (state-
ment of deceased that she had appointment with defendant the evening of
alleged homicide); Matthews v. Great No. Ry., 81 Minn. 363, 84 N. NV. 101(1900) (declarations of deceased as to reasons for boarding train) ; State v.
Hunter, 131 Mum. 252, 154 N. W. 1083 (1915) and State v. Doty, 167 Minn.
164, 208 N. W. 760 (1926) (statements of deceased that she wras going to
defendant for abortion); Scott v. Prudential Ins. Co., 203 Minn. 547, 282
N. W. 467 (1938) (statements which negatived likelihood of suicide).
The connection between the statement and the conduct must not be too
remote. Hale v. Life Indemnity & Inv. Co., 65 Minn. 548, 68 N. W 182(1896).
There is, a conflict as to whether uncommunicated threats are admissible
to show that declarant rather than the accused was the aggressor. They are
apparently inadmissible in Minnesota. State v. Dumphey, 4 Minn. (Gil. 340)
438 (1860). See McCormick, Evidence 573 (1954); 35 Minn. L. Rev. 315(1951).
114. Shephard v. United States, 290 U. S. 96 (1933).
115. See Atherton v. Gaslin, 194 Ky. 460, 239 S. W. 771 (1922). The
problems are discussed and the cases classified in 6 Wigmore § 1736.
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Miscellaneous Exceptions
In addition to the exceptions already discussed the Uniform
Rules recognize some 20 more. Limitations of space forbid any
extended treatment of them but most of them will be briefly noted.
(1) Busness Entries. Rule 63(13) embodies the substance of
the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act which was adopted
in Minnesota in 1939 110 Rule 63(14) makes explicit the admissi-
bility of evidence of the "absence" of an entry in a business record
which is probably already Minnesota law IT"
(2) Reports and Findings of Public Officials. Rule 63(15)
would admit written reports or findings of fact of any federal or
state official if the judge finds that it was made within the scope of
the official's duty "and that it was his duty (a) to perform the act
reported, or (b) to observe the act, condition or event reported, or
(c) to investigate the facts concerning the act, condition or event
and to make findings or draw conclusions based on such investiga-
tion.""18 Clause (c) goes beyond the common law in that it admits
statements not within the personal knowledge of the reporter or of
the recorder. 119 It would change Minnesota law 120
(3) Reports by Persons Exclusively Authorized. The comment
to Rule 63(16) shows it would admit written reports required to
be made by "persons who are sometimes said to be ad hoc public
officials, such as physicians, undertakers and ministers of the gospel
but it is not confined to them.''2
116. See Minn. Stat. §§ 600.01-600.04 (1953). The Note in 24 Minn. L.
Rev. 958 (1940) discusses the adoption of this statute.
117 Topinka v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co., 189 Minn. 75, 248
N. W 660 (1933), Schoonover v. Prudential Ins. Co., 187 Minn. 343, 245
N. W 476 (1932).
118. See Minn. Stat. § 600.13 "The original record made by any pub-
lic officer in the performance of his official duty shall be prima facie evidence
of the facts required or permitted by law to be by him recorded." And see
Corstvet, Trial Manual of Minnesota Evidence, §§ 5326 et seq. (1944).
119. McCoruck, Evidence 617 (1954). The Commissioners state in the
comment that adequate protection is given the adverse party by Rule 64 which
provides that any writing admissible under exceptions (15), (16), (17), (18),
and (19) shall be "received only if the party offering such writing has de-
livered a copy of it or so much thereof, as may relate to the controversy, to
each adverse party a reasonable time before trial unless the judge finds that
such adverse party has not been unfairly surprised by the failure to deliver
such copy."
120. See Barnes v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 233 Minn. 410, 47 N. W
2d 180 (1951), Backstrom v. New York Life Ins., 183 Minn. 384, 236 N. W
708 (1931), 16 Minn. L. Rev. 209 (1932). See also 25 Minn. L. Rev. 949
(1941).
121. See Krema v. Great No. Life Ins. Co., 204 Minn. 186, 282 N. W
822 (1938), Miller v. McCarthy, 198 Minn. 497, 270 N. W 559 (1936),
In re Olson, 176 Minn. 360, 223 N. W 677 (1929)
(Vol. 40:455
THE HEARSAY RULE
(4) Certificate of Marriage. A certificate of marriage is made
admissible by Rule 63(18) to prove the truth of its recitals if the
maker was authorized to perform marriage ceremonies and the
certificate was issued at the time of the ceremony or within a rea-
sonable time thereafter.
(5) Records of Documents Affecting Property. An official rec-
ord of a document "purporting to establish or effect an interest in
property" is made admissible by Rule 63(19) as evidence of "the
content of the original recorded document and its execution and
delivery by each person by whom it purports to have been executed."
(6) Judgmiet of Previous Felony Conviction. Rule 63(20)
would admit evidence "of a final judgment adjudging a person guilty
of a felony, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment." As
the comments to this Rule point out, a judgment of conviction is
analytically hearsay when offered against the person convicted in a
later civil case involving some of the same issues. Although most
courts deny admissibility, - -22 they have done so, not on the theory
of hearsay, but upon a principle similar to that of res judicata. Con-
sequently, the findings' are received only wlere there is a similarity
of parties and of issues. When they are received they come in, not
as evidence merely but as conclusive determinations of the issues.12 3
Nevertheless, a growing minority of courts have departed from the
older. rule and have admitted the judgment of conviction as evi-
dence of the facts on which the judgment was based.u4 This view
was embodied in the Model Code provision that would admit a
judgment of conviction "of a crime or a misdemeanor."125 The com-
ments to the Model Code provision give the following reasons for
the exception:126
"Where a person has had an opportunity to defend himself
and has entered a plea of nolo contendere or a plea of guilty or
has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment
entered on the plea or verdict certainly has sufficient value to
122. McCormick, Evidence 618 (1954); 4 Wigmore § 1346a; 5 Wig-
more § 1671a. This is apparently the Minnesota view also. Warren v. Marsh,
215 Minn. 615, 11 N. W. 2d 528 (1943) ; Mills v. Harstead, 189 Minn. 193,
248 N. W. 705 (1933) ; True v. Citizens Ins. Co., 187 Minn. 636, 246 N. V.
474 (1933).
- It is also specifically provided by statute in Minnesota that convictions
under the Highway Traffic Regulation Act shall not be admissible as evi-
dence "in any, court in any civil action." Minn. Stat. § 169.94 (1953). And see
Warren v. Marsh, supra.
123. McCormick, Evidence 618 (1954).
124. McCormick, Evidence 619 (1954). And see Note, 39 Va. L. Rev.
995 (1953) and Annot, 18 A. L. R. 2d 1287 (1951).
125. Model Code of Evidence, Rule 521 (1942).
126. Id. at 281.
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be worth consideration by a trier of fact, and necessarily in-
cludes a finding of all facts essential to sustain the judgment in
the particular case."
It has been pointed out that the principles on which is founded the
official written statements exception to the hearsay rule would
justify an exception for judgments of conviction. 127
Rule 63(20) does not go as far as the Model Code but limits the
exception to felony convictions. The Commissioners' comment
recognized a "widespread opposition to opening the door to let in
evidence of convictions of traffic violations in actions which later
develop over responsibility for damages. In other words, trials and
convictions in traffic courts and possibly in misdemeanor cases
generally, often do not have about them the tags of trustworthiness
as they often are the result of expediency or compromise."
(7) Commercial Lists and Learned Treaties. Rule 63(30)
would admit "evidence of matters of interest to persons engaged
in an occupation contained in" commercial lists and the like "if
the judge finds that the compilation is published for use by persons
engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon
by them. 12 8 Rule 63(31) would admit, if the judge finds it a
"reliable authority in the subject," treatises, periodicals or pam-
phlets on subjects of "history, science or art to prove the truth of a
matter stated therein.' 2
9
(8) Rentaining exceptions. Rule 63(21) makes admissible, in
behalf of the judgment debtor in an action for indemnity, evidence
of the prior judgment "to prove the wrong of the adverse party and
the amount of damages sustained by the judgment creditor." Rule
63(22) makes admissible, "to prove any fact which was essential
to the judgment," evidence of a final judgment "determining the
interest or lack of interest of the public or of a state or nation or
governmental division thereof in land." Rules 63(23), 63(24),
63(25) and 63(26) relate to pedigree declarations. 1 0 Rule 63(27)
would admit evidence of community reputation concerning bound-
127 McCormick, Evidence 619 (1954).
128. See Bart v. City of New Ulm, 72 N. W 2d 303 (Minn. 1955).
Whitcomb v. Automobile Ins. Co., 167 Minn. 362, 209 N. W 27 (1926), 20
Minn. L. Rev. 680 (1936), 7 Minn. L. Rev. 412 (1923).
129. Learned treatises are not admissible as substantive evidence ti
Minnesota nor in most states. They may be used on cross-examination to
impeach an expert. See 39 Minn. L. Rev. 905 (1955).
130. For cases involving the pedigree and family history exception ti
Minnesota see In re Gravunder, 195 Minn. 487, 263 N. W 458 (1935),
Geisler v. Geisler, 160 Minn. 463, 200 N. W 472 (1924), Hoyt v. Lightbody,
98 Minn. 189, 108 N. W 843 (1906), Houlton v. Manteuffel, 51 Minn. 185,
53 N. W 541 (1892), Backdahl v. Grand Lodge, 46 Minn. 61, 48 N. W
454 (1891), Dawson v. Mayall, 45 Minn. 408, 48 N. W 12 (1891).
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aries,131 general history, and family history of persons resident in
the community. Rule 63(28) provides that if a trait of a person's
character is material, evidence of reputation not only in the com-
munity in which he lives but "in a group with which he then
habitually associated," is allowed. Finally, Rule 63 (29) would admit
recitals in dispositive documents as proof of the matter stated.
It makes no distinction based on the age of the document. It does
not appear that any of these rules would make any significant
change in Minnesota law.,
CONCLUSION
On the whole, the Uniform Rules treat the hearsay rule con-
servatively. The traditional exceptions are retained. A few are
liberalized and extended. The adoption of the rules, however, would
make a number of changes in Minnesota law. The most important
are as follows: ,
1. Rule 63(1) would let in the prior consistent or inconsistent
statements of a person present as a witness and available for cross-
examination as substantive evidence of the facts stated.
2. Rule 63(4) (a) would admit contemporaneous statements
made while the declarant was actually perceiving the event or con-
dition described even though the event was not a "startling" one.
3. Rule 63(5) would extend the use of dying declarations to all
kinds of actions whether civil or criminal.
4. Rule 63 (10) would admit declarations against interest with-
out a showing 6f unavailability and would embrace declarations
acknowledging civil or criminal liability or affecting social interests.
5. Rule 63(12) would admit statements of existing physical
and mental condition to whomsoever made and would admit a pa-
tient's declaration of his past pain or symptoms when made to a
physician consulted for treatment.
6. Rule 63(15) would admit official reports by officers who did
not observe the facts but who had a duty to investigate the facts
and report their findings.
7 Rule 63(20) would permit the use of a judgment of convic-
tion of a felony to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment.
131. See Minneapolis & St L. Ry. v. Ellsworth, 237 Minn. 439, 54 N. AV.
2d 800 (1952) ; Thoen v. Roche, 57 Minnm 135, 58 N. ,V. 686 (1894).

